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SPECULATIVE NATURALISM: A MANIFESTO 
Arran Gare 
 
‘[M]anifestos proclaim new literary movements and cultural epochs, and they 
trigger these movements by the very act of their proclamation. Manifestos are 
performative rather than descriptive speech acts; they implement what they 
pronounce. … Manifestos are neither factual nor fictional – they are formative.’  
Mikhail Epstein, The Transformative Humanities: A Manifesto 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The turn to analytic philosophy in Anglophone countries, which is still underway 
and is spreading elsewhere, has generally involved a retreat from ‘synoptic’ thinking and an 
almost complete withdrawal from ‘synthetic’ thinking, the creative thinking that in the past has 
been the source of the greatest contributions of philosophy to science, the humanities and 
civilization. Analytic philosophy’s ‘naturalistic turn’ led by Willard van Ormond Quine was 
really a capitulation of philosophy to mainstream reductionist science. So-called ‘continental 
philosophy’ when it abjures naturalism, offers no real challenge to this. This paper attempts to 
recover a much more powerful challenge to such analytic philosophy and reductionist science, a 
philosophy which is naturalist but values synopsis and synthesis along with analysis: speculative 
naturalism. As such, this is presented as a manifesto not only for philosophy, but for science and 
the humanities. As Mikhail Epstein argued, the practical outcome of the humanities is the 
transformation of culture. To transform culture is to transform ourselves, our society and our 
relationship to each other and to nature. 
KEYWORDS: Speculative Philosophy; Analytic Philosophy; Idealism; Naturalism; Dialectics; 
Schelling; C.D. Broad; Mikhail Epstein; C.S. Peirce; A.N. Whitehead. 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Speculative Naturalism’ distinguishes itself both from the kind of philosophy that 
eschews speculation and focuses on critical analysis, and from Idealism, the tradition 
that, reacting against the scientific revolution of the Seventeenth Century, defined 
nature entirely in relation to and as secondary to mind or Spirit. While the two 
opposing poles of philosophy, analytic versus speculative and naturalist versus Idealist, 
are not identical, in recent decades there has been a strong tendency to assume that 
they coincide. In USA the tradition of critical analysis, or analytic philosophy has 
www.cosmosandhistory.org  300 
 ARRAN GARE 301 
vigorously upheld naturalism, equated with scientism, the view that the methods of 
mainstream science can be extended to explain every aspect of reality. Philosophy that 
is not analytic and naturalist tends to be labelled ‘continental philosophy’, with the 
usually tacit assumption that ‘continental’ philosophers (many of them in Anglophone 
countries) are claiming to uphold intuitions or forms of enquiry and reasoning that 
transcend any naturalistic explanation, and in doing so, are upholding some form of 
Idealism. Speculative naturalism not only brings into question the correlation between 
these poles but rejects them as the root cause of the paralysis and marginalization of 
philosophy, and along with this, the entrenchment of nihilistic assumptions in the 
broader culture that are now paralysing communities and governments in the face of 
massive economic, social, political and ecological problems. Speculative naturalists are 
concerned to reinstate philosophy to its former pre-eminent status in intellectual life in 
order to challenge and overcome these nihilistic assumptions. 
On the surface of it, the vagueness and even crudeness of the terms defining these 
poles and the difficulty of classifying all philosophers on one side or the other of these 
oppositions would make such strong claims and such a strong agenda highly 
questionable. It is possible to point to a whole range of philosophers who cannot be 
pigeonholed by these categories, including analytic philosophers opposed to naturalism, 
or at least to scientism, and the recent ‘continental’ philosophers promoting 
‘speculative materialism’. However, it is not so much explicitly defended views that are 
the real target of this essay, although these are a major part of the problem, but tacitly 
held assumptions that constrain the way people think and the way debates are framed, 
the way disciplines, universities and research institutions are organized, and the way 
some philosophers have enormous influence on academics, people in power and the 
broader public, while others, with more profound ideas, are ignored and then 
forgotten. The tacitly assumed polar oppositions are manifest in the recurring debates 
between what C.P. Snow referred to as the two cultures, science and the humanities, 
Snow’s debate with Leavis echoing the earlier debate between Mathew Arnold and 
T.H. Huxley, which in turn resonated with debates at the time in Germany, France, 
Russia and Italy and the earlier critique by Goethe of Newton and of Goethe by 
Helmholtz. This opposition is also manifest in the opposition between orthodox and 
humanistic Marxism and between positivist and humanist human sciences.  
The trajectory of these polar oppositions is evident in the virtual self-destruction of 
the humanities in Anglophone countries in the last decades of the Twentieth Century 
through deconstructive post-modernism, which was really a capitulation to a 
triumphant ‘scientism’ (the view of science defended by logical empiricists), and the 
collapse of career prospects for those educated in the humanities in the civil service, 
institutions of education, media and politics. It is also evident in the unprecedented 
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authority of neo-classical economists, the success of the neoliberal project of 
subordinating democracy to markets, promoting a new global ruling class of corporate 
managers, and the failure of those who have struggled to revive genuine or ‘strong’ 
democracy. To reveal what is tacitly assumed, how these oppositions have played out 
and why, and how these assumptions structure culture and society, it is necessary to 
provide an historical perspective on how these oppositions developed and co-evolved.  
THE RISE OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE ECLIPSE OF SPECULATIVE 
PHILOSOPHY 
To begin with, it is necessary to look at the opposition between analytic and speculative 
philosophy. This opposition was characterized by C.D. Broad, a leading British 
philosopher whose career coincided with the eclipse of speculative philosophy, in a 
famous paper published in 1924, and another towards the end of his career in 1947. In 
the 1924 paper, Broad characterized critical philosophy, which is what we would now 
refer to as analytic philosophy, as analysis and clarification of the basic concepts and 
presuppositions of ordinary life and of science. It was assumed by its proponents that 
philosophical problems can be treated and dealt with in isolation from each other, and 
that philosophy, like science, could accumulate indubitable knowledge. On the other 
hand, speculative philosophers attempt to arrive at an overall conception of the nature 
of the universe and the position within it of human beings by taking into account the 
whole range of human experience—scientific, social, ethical, aesthetic, and religious. 
“Its business is to take over all aspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and 
to try to think out a view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them”, 
Broad wrote.1 In his later paper, Broad characterized the methods used by such 
philosophers as ‘analysis’, ‘synopsis’ (i.e. ‘seeing together’, whereby the inconsistencies 
between various aspects of experience are confronted) and most importantly and 
uniquely, ‘synthesis’, which aims to ‘supply a set of concepts and principles which shall 
cover satisfactorily all the various regions of fact which are being viewed synoptically.’2 
Speculative philosophy utilizes analysis, synopsis and synthesis. 
Most analytic philosophers have excluded any role for synthesis and radically 
reduced the role accorded to synopsis in philosophy, particularly in USA. They are 
concerned with truth claims of sentences rather than with life and the cosmos, while 
often denying that there are any specifically philosophical truths. They deny validity to 
the forms of reasoning and experiencing associated with the claims to knowledge of 
1 C.D. Broad, ‘Critical and Speculative Philosophy’, Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements (First 
Series), ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1924): 77-100, p. 96.  
2 Professor C.D. Broad, ‘Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy’, Aristotelian Society Supplement 21, 1947: 1-
32, p.22. 
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speculative philosophers, and of the humanities and arts generally. Analytic philosophy 
originated in England with G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, but it had its roots in 
Germany and Austria, particularly in the work of Gottlob Frege.3 From Austria, 
Germany and England it spread to USA. Centrally, it involved redefining and 
privileging the notion of analysis and focusing philosophy on ‘objective meaning’. 
While Kant had argued that synthesis is involved in both empirical knowledge 
(synthetic a posteriori knowledge) and mathematical and metaphysical knowledge 
(synthetic a priori knowledge), in characterizing the meaning relations between signs, 
Frege developed a philosophy that eliminated any role for mental processes, whether 
ideas, images or imaginative projections.4 Following Franz Bolzano and Rudolf 
Herman Lotze, he claimed that truth pertains to propositions, not concepts, and 
rejected Kant’s claim that arithmetic is a form of synthetic a priori knowledge.  
While analytic philosophy has evolved since Broad wrote, throughout its history it 
has been characterized by an implicit respect for argument, clarity and precision that 
its proponents believe can only be achieved by focusing on narrow topics.5 It divided 
over the relationship between ordinary language and the language of science and the 
role accorded to mathematical logic and its interpretation. The later Wittgenstein, John 
Austin, Peter Strawson, Stanley Cavell and John Searle exemplify a tradition defending 
ordinary language and informal argument against mathematical logic and the concepts 
of science. However, the most influential analytic philosophers, particularly in USA, 
have privileged mathematical logic and along with this, have upheld the cognitive 
claims of science and its ambitions to explain everything, including all aspects of 
human existence. In USA philosophy itself was redefined by some of the most 
influential analytic philosophers as a form of science concerned with logical inference 
and the truth of propositions, statements or sentences.  
For the leading US philosopher of the mid-twentieth century, W.V. Quine, 
philosophy was seen as differing from science only in degree of generality. Quine 
claimed that the core of philosophy is logic, and wrote of this: ‘Logic, like any science, 
3 Robert Hanna in Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000 argues that 
‘Bolzano and Helmholtz are the advance guard of analytic philosophy ... [and] Frege is the first of its two 
Founding Fathers.’ (p.6). From a different perspective, see also J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from 
Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
4 See Hanna, ‘The Significance of Syntheticity’, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, chap.4.  
5 On contemporary analytic philosophy, see H.-J. Glock, What Is Analytic Philosophy? Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. Scandinavian analytic philosophers generally are far less dogmatic and far more open to 
different schools of philosophy. See for instance the characterization of analytic philosophy by Dagfinn 
Føllesdal, ‘Analytic Philosophy: What is it and Why Should one Engage in It? Ratio, 9(3, 1996): 193-208.  
Føllesdal defines analytic philosophy as a commitment to argument and justification as opposed to using 
rhetoric, and on this basis includes hermeneuticists and phenomenologists as analytic philosophers. 
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has as its business the pursuit of truth. What is true are certain statements; and the 
pursuit of truth is the endeavor to sort out the true statements from the others, which 
are false.’6 What naturalism really meant for Quine and his followers was ‘scientism’, 
the identification of all worthwhile knowledge with the knowledge gained by scientists. 
Quine defended the naturalization of epistemology, by which he meant that scientific 
knowledge itself could be treated as an object of scientific investigation. Quine and his 
disciples embraced behaviourism, epiphenomenalism or some other form of 
reductionist theory of mind in accordance with what they took to be respectable from a 
scientific point of view.  
Through control of who gained academic appointments, Quine and his disciples 
dominated the direction of American philosophy. Their agenda was exemplified in the 
work of Philip Kitcher who attempted to explain naturalistically mathematics and its 
development, of Jaegwon Kim who continued to develop and defend a naturalized 
epistemology,7 and along with this, defended a form of epiphenomenalism, and of 
Quine’s student Daniel Dennett who embraced and defended Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, including the ideas of Richard Dawkins, and promoted a computational model 
of the mind and brain.8 Their success in imposing their agenda was summed up by 
Hans-Johann Glock: 
In the wake of Quine, few analytic philosophers these days would dare to publish 
a book on the philosophy of mind, without at least professing allegiance to some 
form of naturalism in the preface. Thus Jackson states: ‘Most analytic 
philosophers describe themselves as naturalists’ ….  Kim confines the point to the 
present: ‘If current analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical 
ideology, it is, unquestionably, naturalism’ …. And Leiter … diagnoses a 
‘naturalistic turn’ in philosophy that rivals the earlier linguistic turn in 
importance.9  
And this has meant that, as Robert Hanna put, ‘all serious metaphysical, 
epistemological, and methodological questions in philosophy can be answered only by 
direct appeal to the natural sciences.’ Quine’s transformation of the analytic tradition 
can appropriately be dubbed the ‘scientific turn.’ After Quine ‘analytic philosophy is 
scientific philosophy.’10 
6 W.V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, xi. 
7 Philip Kitcher, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984 and Jagwon 
Kim “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?,” Philosophical Perspectives 2. Epistemology, James E. Tomberlin 
(ed.) Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1988, pp. 381–405. 
8 The nature and agenda of such naturalism has been described by Jack Ritchie in Understanding Naturalism, 
Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008. 
9 Hans-Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.137. 
10 Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, p.10. 
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THE IDEALIST OPPOSITION TO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 
The extent to which such views dominate is evident not only in the triumph of this way 
of understanding philosophy in Anglophone countries but its spread to Europe in 
recent years, despite growing dissent from within analytic philosophy itself. It is also 
evident in the way those opposing this conception of philosophy usually define their 
views in opposition to naturalism, rejecting naturalism to affirm humanity and the 
human condition in all its richness and diversity as the reference point for developing 
philosophy. Generally, those reacting to the perceived sterility of most analytic 
philosophy turned to German, French, or occasionally Italian philosophers and 
traditions for inspiration. Hegelianism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, hermeneutic 
phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, structuralism, poststructuralism and 
more recently Ernst Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism have all been embraced as antidotes to 
analytic philosophy. While this has involved studying a vast range of thinkers, Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger have served as the main reference points for 
these traditions, and it is impossible to understand Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl or 
Heidegger except in relation to Kant and his second Copernican Revolution. This 
revolution made consciousness and the problem of knowledge the reference point for 
philosophy in place of being, and it was this, rather than the arguments of Berkeley, 
that inspired the Idealist tradition of thought.  
This might appear a gross oversimplification, since Kant himself was opposed to 
Idealism. Certainly Hegel was an Idealist, but Frederick Beiser in an influential work 
on Hegel has argued that the influence of Kant on Hegel has been grossly overstated.11 
Nietzsche was hostile to Idealism and defended a form of naturalism. Following 
Brentano, Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, began by calling on philosophers to 
go back to Aristotle rather than back to Kant, and initially upheld a form of realism on 
this basis. Heidegger and those influenced by him aligned themselves with 
phenomenology. 
However, Beiser’s claims are questionable, Nietzsche’s perspectivism manifests the 
influence on him of Kant. Husserl increasingly came under the influence of neo-
Kantianism and in doing so developed phenomenology in a more Idealist direction. 
Michael Friedman has shown that Heidegger’s turn to Husserl and then to 
hermeneutics was taken to overcome problems in neo-Kantianism, which was his real 
starting point.12 Even the structuralism and post-structuralism of more recent French 
philosophy can trace its roots back to Ernst Cassirer, the most influential neo-Kantian 
in Germany before the rise of Naziism. Almost all continental philosophy appears to be 
11  Frederick Beiser, Hegel, New York: Routledge, 2005, p.9. 
12 Michael Friedman, The Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Peru; Illinois: Open Court, 2000, 
p.39ff. 
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either neo-Kantian or post-Kantian, absorbing Kant’s skeptical arguments against a 
facile acceptance of appearances, including appearances of nature, as reality. A strong 
case has been made for this by Lee Braver who argued in A Thing of This World: A 
History of Continental Anti-Realism that Kant’s Copernican Revolution suffused the 
thought of the greatest philosophers of continental Europe, including Hegel, Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, up until the present, and that Kant engendered an enduring antipathy 
to realism, particularly scientific realism.13 Tacitly, this carried with it an antipathy to 
naturalism. A manifestation of this is that there has been an almost complete lack of 
engagement by the most prominent philosophers in these traditions of continental 
philosophy with the problem of explaining how sentient, self-conscious humans could 
have evolved from and within nature.  
Nevertheless, these traditions were not so hostile to speculative thought, or the 
humanities, as analytic philosophers. Kant had attempted to arrive at apodictic 
knowledge of the a priori assumptions that are the condition for being able to organize 
the sensory manifold into an intelligible world, denying any place for intellectual 
intuition or speculation. First Fichte, and then following him, Hegel, Schleiermacher 
and Schelling regarded their work as speculative because they gave a place to a third 
kind of experience along with sensible objects and the concepts required to cognize 
them as such – experience of reflection on the nature and development of experience 
and on the generation of concepts, and on the adequacy of concepts used to interpret 
experience. Appreciating that concepts have changed through history, they were 
inspired to develop more adequate concepts. Under the influence of Greek thought, 
such ambitions often were combined with efforts to accord causal efficacy to Ideas. 
This was the post-Kantian tradition of speculative Idealism, the most notable figures 
philosophers are taken to be (I will argue mistakenly) Solomon Maimon, J.G. Fichte, 
Friedrich Schelling, G.W.F. Hegel, F.H. Jacobi and Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
These German philosophers helped inspire British and American Idealism, which 
gave a central place to speculation and also came to be known as speculative Idealism, 
the most eminent proponents of which were T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley in Britain 
and Josiah Royce in USA.14 Speculative Idealism came to be identified with a 
coherence theory of truth and a view of reality as an organism comprising a Self, Mind 
or Spiritual principle. These Idealists were seen by their opponents as the epigone of 
the German speculative Idealists. The British Idealists in particular were the target of 
the early analytic philosophers in Britain, who often characterized their own position as 
13 Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism, Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2007. 
14 On the British Idealists, see W.J. Mander, British Idealism: A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, esp, chap. 4 ‘The Metaphysics of the Absolute.’  
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a defense of realism against Idealism. Consequently, there has been a strong tendency 
by analytic philosophers to identify speculative philosophy with speculative Idealism, a 
contamination of Anglophone philosophy by continental traditions, and then to define 
this as the ultimate polar opposite of first the realism, and then later, particularly in 
USA, the naturalism upheld by analytic philosophers.    
Again, it is not only the diverse views expressed that are important here, views 
which for the purpose of this argument I have greatly simplified, but the unexpressed 
and institutionalized tendency to categorize philosophers on one side or the other of 
this divide and to be blind to or to misinterpret views that do not fit into one or the 
other of these opposing sides. The tendency to categorize philosophy as either analytic 
or continental, and then as either naturalistic (often equated with materialist) or 
speculative Idealist, and to conflate these two oppositions, has had the effect of blinding 
people to, or at least facilitating the marginalization of, a tradition that is naturalistic, 
humanistic and speculative at the same time, a far more potent opposition to the 
creeping dominance of analytic philosophers claiming a monopoly on naturalism and 
the prestige of associating with science and mathematics.  
RECOVERING THE TRADITION OF SPECULATIVE NATURALISM 
This blindness is evident in the misinterpretation of major philosophers and a failure to 
acknowledge their achievements and influence. The most blatant misrepresentation of 
a major philosopher, a philosopher who should be recognized as a founder and one of 
the most important figures in the tradition of speculative naturalism, is Schelling. As 
noted, Schelling is generally categorized as an Idealist. Schelling figures prominently as 
an Idealist in a recent major work on the history of German philosophy by one of the 
leading American historians of German philosophy, Frederick Beiser, titled German 
Idealism. Yet in his System of Transcendental Idealism devoted to deducing categories to 
grasp the whole of reality, Schelling clearly states that transcendental philosophy, 
which takes the subjective as primary, is only one part of philosophy, the other being 
nature-philosophy (Naturphilosophie) which takes the objective as primary. For nature-
philosophy,  
The concept of nature does not entail that there should also be an intelligence that 
is aware of it. Nature, it seems, would exist, even if there were nothing that was 
aware of it. Hence the problem can also be formulated thus: how does intelligence 
come to be added to nature, or how does nature come to be presented?’15  
What is important to note here is that this is not a repudiation of Kant’s Copernican 
revolution, but a second (or third) Copernican revolution by which the transcendental 
15 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, [1800], 1978, p.5. 
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is naturalized. Schelling radicalized Kant and Fichte by pointing out that the condition 
for the possibility of science is that nature must be conceived such that it can and has 
generated conscious beings that can understand how they have been generated within 
nature, and how they have became conscious of themselves as participants in nature. 
Nature has become conscious of itself through them. This is speculative naturalism. 
Soon after, in Universal Deduction of the Dynamical Processes where he attempted a 
‘dynamic construction of matter’, Schelling argued that the Philosophy of Nature is 
more fundamental than Idealism,16 and in the third version of The Ages of the World 
written circa 1815 he characterized Idealism as the philosophy of people who had 
dissociated themselves from the forces that are the basis of their existence and become 
‘nothing but images, just dreams of shadows’.17 It was in his First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature (published in 1799) that Schelling defended speculation as 
‘Speculative Physics’. Rather than just accepting the concepts of Newtonian science, 
Schelling argued that these have to be revealed, questioned and transcended to make 
intelligible the emergence of life and humanity. Many years later, circa 1835, lecturing 
on the history of modern philosophy, Schelling argued that his philosophy transcended 
the opposition between materialism and spiritualism, realism and Idealism (Schelling, 
1994, 120). In his 1842 lectures in which he set out to attack Hegel’s Idealism, Schelling 
clarified the difference between naturalism and Idealism that has defined the difference 
between Idealism and speculative naturalism ever since. While Hegel had argued that 
Being is the most empty concept, Schelling argued that philosophers must accept that 
there is an unprethinkable being (unvordenkliche Sein) that precedes all thought, including 
scientific and philosophical thought.  
Another instance illustrating how the dualistic categorization of philosophy leads 
misrepresentations is the misinterpretation of R.G. Collingwood. A major opponent of 
analytic philosophy, Collingwood is almost always portrayed as an Idealist. However, 
he himself pointed out that his own views had been misrepresented because only two 
philosophical positions were recognized, realism (defended for the most part by analytic 
philosophers) and Idealism. As he wrote in his autobiography, ‘any one opposing the 
16 F. Schelling, “Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Processes oder der Kategorien der Physik”, 
(F.W.J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, (SW) ed. K.F.A. Schelling I Abtheilung vols 1-10, II Abtheilung vols 1-4, 
Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61, I/4:1-78).  
17 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 5 (SW I/3:338-40), and F.W.J. Schelling, The Ages of the 
World, Third Version (c.1815), trans. Jason W. Wirth (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 
106; (SW I/8:343/342). On the prioritizing of the Philosophy of Nature, see Beiser, German Idealism, 489.  In 
1809 Schelling argued that idealism is inadequate for characterizing human freedom, being only capable of 
a formal conception, not “not the real and vital conception of freedom … that … is a possibility of good 
and evil.” Schelling: Of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), 26; (SW 
I/7:352). 
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“realists” was automatically classified as an “idealist”, which meant a belated survivor 
of Green’s school.’18 Reviving the tradition of Greek philosophy, Collingwood 
developed a logic of question and answer, which itself is an aspect of dialectical 
thinking. As developed by Collingwood, this became an important method for exposing 
hierarchies of assumptions to reveal the ultimate metaphysical assumptions of an era. 
Collingwood is most well known as a philosopher of history and as an historian, but he 
also wrote on the Idea of Nature, essentially a history of the philosophy of nature, and 
offered his own speculative philosophy of nature very much in the Schellingian 
tradition.19   
Many other philosophers have been similarly mis-categorized. Schelling’s Nature 
Philosophy had an enormous influence on other philosophers, who have also tended to 
be misinterpreted. C.S. Peirce, for instance, who is usually classified with the 
pragmatists defined by their support for the pragmatist theory of truth, wrote to 
William James: ‘My views were probably influenced by Schelling … by all stages of 
Schelling, but especially by the Philosophie der Natur. I consider Schelling enormous … If 
you were to call my philosophy Schellingianism transformed in the light of modern 
physics, I should not take it hard.’20 While philosophers paid attention to Peirce’s work 
in logic and epistemology, until recently his speculative cosmology was not taken 
seriously. Like Schelling, Peirce was a speculative naturalist concerned to conceive 
physical existence in a way that would enable humans to be understood as products of 
and creative participants in nature, with metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics accorded a 
place in his philosophy along with logic and science. This was also true of other 
philosophers categorized as pragmatists, including John Dewey and George Herbert 
Mead. Friedrich Engels, Henri Bergson, Aleksandr Bogdanov (the founder of 
‘tektology’) and Alfred North Whitehead were also indirectly influenced by Schelling 
and each has advanced the tradition of speculative naturalism.  
SPECULATIVE THINKING AS DIALECTICS 
This schematic history of the background to the development of speculative naturalism 
is designed to provide some idea of what it entails preliminary to defending it. The 
defense of speculation was in response to the perceived limitations of Kant’s 
transcendental deductions and his proscription of intellectual intuition whereby people 
could gain knowledge of the development of cognition while, unlike the anti-Kantians, 
18 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939, p56. 
19 See Guido Vanheeswijck, ‘R.G. Collingwood and A.N. Whitehead on Metaphysics, History, and 
Cosmology’, Process Studies 27/3-4, Fall-Winter, 1998: 215-236. 
20 Letter dated January 28th, 1894, quoted by Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, 
Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977, 203;  
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accepting the value of Kant’s arguments that experience is organized by imagination 
and concepts. Speculation, by which not only the development of cognition and (for 
Schelling) nature could be comprehended, but old concepts could be questioned and 
new conceptual framework elaborated, was given a place through the revival of 
dialectics, although there were differences in how dialectics was understood. Fichte and 
Schelling gave more place to imagination, construction and will than Hegel, whose 
Logic was seen to be a geometrization of the dialectic. This work illustrated the direction 
an Idealist dialectic could take. The most sustained effort to characterize dialectics 
explicitly was Friedrich Schleiermacher’s lectures on philosophy, published as Dialectic 
or, The Art of Doing Philosophy, where he explicitly relates dialectic to speculation.21 What 
is clear from this work is the complexity of dialectics compared to the characterization 
of reasoning by mainstream analytic philosophers, and how Schleiermacher anticipated 
conceptions of rationality developed by the post-positivist philosophers of science. 
Schelling’s dialectics, practiced rather than explicitly defended, is even more open than 
Schleiermacher’s, and particularly in his later work, highlights the difference between 
an Idealist dialect and the dialectical thinking of a naturalist.  
Recognizing the unprethinkable Being preceding all thinking undermines the basis 
for assuming that the quest for comprehensive understanding of the whole can ever be 
finally successful, although it is still necessary to strive for this. Enquiry is not seen as a 
patchwork of empirical investigations that can be later collected together and 
systematically organized into a coherent logical structure for convenience, but assumes 
its goal to be an integral, coherent comprehension of the whole. There are no absolute 
starting points or foundations for knowledge in this quest, either in experience or in 
reason, and no conclusions that are beyond further questioning, although the received 
view of what the goal of enquiry is can be taken as a foundation of sorts.22 The 
characterization of knowledge can only emerge through competing claims to 
knowledge in which prevailing assumptions about what is knowledge have been 
challenged by proposing alternatives. It also involves appreciating that current 
arguments, including arguments over what is knowledge, take place in the context of 
traditions of thought and inquiry formed by a history of questioning, investigating, 
experimenting, searching for evidence, discussing and arguing. To participate in these 
traditions requires an appreciation of their past achievements and failures, what 
21 As Schleiermacher put it, ‘mathematics is more closely allied to the empirical form, dialectic more allied 
to the speculative form. … [S]peculative natural science can be set forth only according to dialectical 
principles…’ Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialectic or, The Art of Doing Philosophy, trans. Terrance N. Tice, 
Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996, p.73. 
22 This is an unusual way of characterizing a foundation, but this has been defended through an exegesis of 
the work of Aristotle and Aquinas by Alasdair MacIntyre in First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary 
Philosophical Issue, Milwaukie: Marquette University Press, 1990. 
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tradition or traditions are dominant in the present, why they are dominant, and what is 
the ultimate goal of enquiry. It is for this reason that the history of philosophy and of 
civilization has always been central to the work of dialectical thinkers. Not only is it 
part of the quest for comprehensive understanding of nature and humanity, but only by 
providing a schematic history that philosophers can define and situate their own work 
in relation to the evolving traditions of philosophy, civilization, humanity and the rest 
of nature and defend their work. Only in relation to such schematic (synoptic) history 
could their own work be justified as superior to what had been achieved in the past.  
While Collingwood, Peirce and Whitehead are not usually considered as 
dialecticians, I think it is evident when their work is examined in the context of the 
development of dialectical thinking, they have made major contributions to 
understanding and developing dialectical thought. Collingwood’s question and answer 
logic is clearly a clarification of what is centrally involved in dialectical thinking. 
Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are clearly influenced by 
Hegelian dialectics,23 but at the same time they make it easier to appreciate Schelling’s 
argument for unprethinkable being. This can be seen as Firstness, the condition for all 
else. Through these categories Peirce developed his theory of semiotics, categorized 
logic in terms of semiotics, and showed that induction and deduction do to not exhaust 
reasoning; reasoning in all domains of inquiry requires also abduction, which is really 
speculation. Speculative reasoning is not exhausted by mathematics and symbolic logic, 
however important these are, and requires the use of ‘real vagues’, terms which are not 
and might never be precisely defined.  
However, it was Whitehead who did most to clarify the goal of speculative 
philosophy and what is involved in developing radically new ways of thinking, new 
ideas and new language to express these.24 
Whitehead defined this goal in Process and Reality: 
23 See Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures 
on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi, New York: SUNY Press, 1997, p.120. In the unpublished MS. 190 
Peirce argued against dialectics, but this appears to be directed at Hegel’s Logic. Joseph l. Esposito who 
discusses this argument in Evolutionary Metaphysics: The Development of Peirce’s Theory of Categories, Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1980, p.31ff. also notes in his preface to this book ‘From his earliest work Peirce’s thought 
had tended toward the direction of a dialectical view of reality and experience.’ (p.5).   
24 See Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929. For an 
exposition of Whitehead’s notion of speculative metaphysics and how it differs from Russell’s 
metaphilosophy, see Arran Gare, 'Speculative Metaphysics and the Future of Philosophy: The 
Contemporary Relevance of Whitehead's Defence of Speculative Metaphysics', Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 77 (2), June, 1999, pp.127-145. See also, Johan Siebers, The Method Of Speculative Philosophy: An 
Essay on the Foundation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics, Kassell: Kassell University Press, 2002. 
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Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary 
system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be 
interpreted. By this notion of 'interpretation' I mean that everything of which we 
are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character 
of a particular instance of the general scheme. Thus the philosophical scheme 
should be coherent, logical, and in respect of interpretation, applicable and 
adequate. Here 'applicable' means that some items of experience are thus 
interpretable, and 'adequate' means that there are no items incapable of such 
interpretation.25 
Whitehead makes it clear that this involves more than analysis when he argues that: 
'Philosophy is the search for premises. It is not deduction. Such deductions as occur are 
for the purpose of testing the starting points by the evidence of the conclusions.'26 Nor 
can they be found though induction. Whitehead also argued that before correlations 
between observations can be of importance, it is first necessary to have schemes of ideas 
into which such observations can be fitted. These schemes precede systematic 
observation, and can be of the greatest significance even when they fail to achieve 
contact with observation. Rationality, in its basic form, is neither deduction nor 
induction, but the search for principles or schemes of ideas. How can this search be 
conducted? To begin with, Whitehead argued that there cannot be a method for this, 
since it is only through such schemes of ideas that methods are established. As he put it: 
‘The speculative Reason is in its essence untrammelled by method. Its function is to 
pierce into the general reasons beyond limited reasons, to understand all methods as 
coordinated in a nature of things only to be grasped by transcending all method.’27 
However, he qualified this, arguing that there is a method of sorts involved in reaching 
beyond set bounds, including all existing methods. It was this 'method' which was 
discovered by the Greeks, and why we now talk of speculative reason rather than 
inspiration. This cannot be understood as the application of a rigid formula. There 
cannot be a fixed, definite procedure of speculative reason such as that of deductive 
logic. What then is speculative reason? And in particular, How does speculation 
operate in philosophy? Essentially, speculative reason is, in Pierce’s terminology, 
abduction, the development of a working hypothesis to elucidate experience. Such 
working hypotheses are arrived at through the generalization of patterns experienced 
in particular domains. Although Whitehead seldom uses the terms, this is a matter of 
25 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality [1929], Ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, 
N.Y.: Free Press, 1978, p.3. 
26 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, N.Y.: Free Press, 1938, p.105. 
27 Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929, p.51. 
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elaborating analogies or metaphors. What is required to elaborate these the 'free play 
of the imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic.'28 
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, SPECULATIVE NATURALISM, AND SCIENCE 
Once the tradition of speculative naturalism is recognized, it is possible to judge it in 
relation to the naturalism of mainstream analytic philosophy. As noted, for the most 
part, analytic philosophers simply misrecognize and ignore speculative naturalists, and 
since they assume that careful analysis will produce indubitable arguments that can be 
added to the bucket of scientific knowledge, there has been very little engagement 
between these two traditions, despite the close relationship between Russell and 
Whitehead. There is one major exception, however, the work of Murray Code who has 
contrasted Peirce and Whitehead on the one hand with Russell and Quine on the 
other, and in a more recent work, revealing the deficiencies in Philip Kitcher’s effort 
develop a naturalistic philosophy of mathematics.29 In response to Kitcher’s work, 
Code, formerly a mathematician, argued that an adequate naturalism requires the 
insights of Peirce and Whitehead with their much fuller account of experience and 
rationality, not only giving a place to feeling, imagination and intuition in mathematics 
but requiring speculative theories of nature to give a place to these along with what can 
be comprehended through mathematics.30 However, analytic philosophers committed 
to scientism have redefined philosophy and rationality so as to absolve themselves from 
even engaging with, let alone taking seriously such arguments. Code’s work has been 
ignored. 
The real point at issue between analytic philosophers and speculative naturalists is 
the identification by analytic philosophers of naturalism with scientism. By identifying 
naturalism with the view of reality and ambitions of mainstream science, these analytic 
philosophers have ruled out any questioning of the assumptions of science or any 
challenge to science from different realms of experience. They not only have accepted, 
but defended the state of our culture where, as Whitehead complained: ‘Philosophy has 
ceased to claim its proper generality, and natural science is content with the narrow 
round of its methods.’31  In doing so, they have ignored Whitehead’s argument that: 
No science can be more secure than the unconscious metaphysics which tacitly it 
presupposes. The individual thing is necessarily a modification of its environment, 
28 Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.5. 
29 See Murray Code, Myths of Reason: Vagueness, Rationality and the Lure of Logic, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1995.  
30 Murray Code, ‘Mathematical Naturalism and the Powers of Symbolisms’, Cosmos & History; The Journal of 
Natural and Social Philosophy, 1(1), 2005: 35-53. See also his ‘On the Poverty of Scientism, or: The Ineluctable 
Roughness of Rationality’, Metaphilosophy, 28(1&2): 102-122. 
31 Whitehead, The Function of Reason, p.50. 
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and cannot be understood in disjunction. All reasoning, apart from some 
metaphysical reference, is vicious. Thus the Certainties of Science are a delusion. 
They are hedged around with unexplored limitations. Our handling of scientific 
doctrines is controlled by the diffused metaphysical concepts of our epoch. Even 
so, we are continually led into errors of expectation. Also, whenever some new 
mode of observational experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog 
of inaccuracies.32 
This has had a destructive effect on science as well as philosophy and the 
humanities, as scientists now ignore the works of philosophers. As the theoretical 
physicist Carlo Rovelli complained, after noting that ‘for thirty years we have failed. 
There hasn’t been a major success in theoretical physics in the last few decades’:  
The divorce between this strict dialogue between philosophers and sciences is very 
recent, in the second half of the 20th century. … There is narrow-mindedness, if I 
may say so, in many of my colleagues who don’t want to learn what’s being said 
in the philosophy of science. There is also a narrow-mindedness in a lot of the 
areas of philosophy and the humanities, whose proponents don’t want to learn 
about science, which is even more narrow-minded.33 
Essentially, by identifying naturalism with mainstream science these philosophers have 
locked in the basic assumptions about nature assumed by reductionist scientists against 
not only the humanities, and thereby greatly contributed to undermining the 
humanities, but against the most creative areas in the natural sciences. In doing so, they 
are not only crippling philosophy but undermining science.  
It is this state of things where scientists are looking to philosophers for new insights 
and finding sycophants defending outmoded scientific ideas that has rendered analytic 
philosophy vulnerable to the challenge of speculative naturalists. What is not properly 
appreciated except by historians of science is just how important speculative philosophy 
has been to science. The influence on science of Schelling and the tradition of 
speculative naturalism he inspired is a major case in point.34 In challenging Newtonian 
physics, Schelling conjectured that a new physics would be developed based on a 
conception of physical existence as productivity with products emerging through 
opposed forces, uniting the study of light, electricity and magnetism. Based on this new 
physics, chemicals and life would be understood as either passive (in the case of 
chemicals) or actively maintained (in the case of life) balances of opposed forces. Those 
32 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p.154. 
33 Carlo Rovelli, ‘Science Is Not About Certainty’, in The Universe, ed. John Brockman, New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2014, p.215, 227 & 228. 
34 See Arran Gare, ‘Overcoming the Newtonian paradigm: The unfinished project of theoretical biology 
from a Schellingian perspective’, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 113, 2013: 5-24. 
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influenced by Schelling succeeded in this project. His work contributed to the 
development of field theory. The whole of chemistry is based on the notion of valency 
and consequent balances between opposed forces. His work also inspired the 
postulation of the first law of thermodynamics, and he put forward a form of systems 
theory and anticipated the development of cybernetics and hierarchy theory.35 
Schelling also developed ideas on mathematics, again radicalizing Kant, that 
influenced Justus and Hermann Grassmann.36 Hermann Grassmann was not only the 
forefather of vector and tensor algebra central to modern physics, but anticipated the 
development of category theory, one of the most active fields of current mathematics.37  
Schelling also had a major influence on other philosophers who also had an 
influence on science and mathematics, notably C.S. Peirce, Henri Bergson and Alfred 
North Whitehead. While the logic and set theory beloved by analytic philosophers is 
proving increasingly irrelevant to understanding advances in contemporary 
mathematics, mathematicians attempting to provide a synthetic theory of mathematics 
adequate to this task have turned back to Peirce’s philosophy to provide this.38 Bergson 
and Whitehead were a major influence on Ilya Prigogine’s work on non-linear 
thermodynamics. The claim by Ilya Prigiogine and Isabelle Stengers that the study of 
dissipative structures generated in far from equilibrium systems heralded a new alliance 
between science and the humanities should be treated as a proclamation of the triumph 
of Schellingian speculative naturalism over Newtonian science. Whitehead’s ideas have 
also been a major influence on physics and post-reductionist biology, most importantly, 
the work of C.H. Waddington.39 Peirce’s ideas have also been taken up and developed 
by bio- and eco-semioticians,40 while the quantum physicist Brian Josephson has 
35 See Arran Gare, ‘From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological 
Civilization’, Cosmos & History, 7(2) 2011: 26-69. 
36 See Michael Otte, ‘Justus and Hermann Grassmann: philosophy and mathematics’, From Past  to Future: 
Grassmann’s Work in Context  Ed. Hans-Joachim Petsche et.al. Basel: Springer, 2011, pp.61-70.. 
37 As F. William Lawvere acknowledged in ‘Grassmann’s Dialectics and Category Theory’, Hermann Günther 
Grassmann (1809-1977): Visionary Mathematician, Scientist and Neohumanist Scholar, Boston Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, Ed. Gert Schubring, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.  
38 See Fernando Zalamea, Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics, Trans. Zachary Luke Fraser, New 
York: Orchard Street, 2012, chap.3.  
39 See Timothy E. Eastman and Hank Keeton, eds. Physics and Whitehead: Quantum, Process, and Experience, 
N.Y.: State University of N.Y. Press, 2004 and Brian G. Henning and Adam C. Scarfe, eds, Beyond 
Mechanism: Putting Life Back into Biology, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013. 
40 See Claus Emmeche and Kalevi Kull eds, Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs, London: 
Imperial College Press, 2011. 
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invoked Peirce’s work on semiotics to interpret quantum theory.41 Speculative 
naturalism is now flourishing among the most original scientists struggling to overcome 
the deficiencies of mainstream physics and comprehend the complexity of life.42 
In short, in refusing to subordinate philosophy to science or to be overawed by past 
achievements of science, being prepared to question the foundations and assumptions 
of mainstream science and to elaborate radically new ways of thinking about nature, 
speculative naturalists, unlike analytic philosophers, have had and continue to have a 
profound and creative influence on science. While analytic philosophers are champions 
of ‘normal’ science, speculative naturalists have been and are essential to 
‘revolutionary’ science. Not only have analytic philosophers failed to contribute to 
science, their promotion of scientism and their fawning attitude towards scientists and 
mathematicians has failed to impress their idols. Gian-Carlo Rota, a leading scientist in 
post-WWII USA, friend of John von Neumann and Stanislav Ulam and a professor of 
applied mathematics and philosophy at MIT, wrote in ‘The Pernicious Influence of 
Mathematics Upon Philosophy’:  
The fake philosophical terminology of mathematical logic has misled philosophers 
into believing that mathematical logic deals with the truth in the philosophical 
sense. But this is a mistake. … The snobbish symbol-dropping found nowadays in 
philosophical papers raises eyebrows among mathematicians, like someone paying 
his grocery bill with Monopoly money.43   
To fill the vacuum created by academic philosophers abrogating their responsibilities, 
leading scientists and mathematicians are extending their work into philosophy and 
taking up and contributing to the tradition of speculative naturalism. David Bohm, Ilya 
Prigogine and Robert Rosen towards the end of the Twentieth Century and Howard 
Pattee, Stan Salthe, Mae-Wan Ho, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull, Stuart Kauffman, 
Henry Stapp, Lee Smolin and Robert Ulanowicz in the present are obvious examples 
of this, but this is nothing new. C.S. Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead were 
originally mathematicians and scientists before becoming philosophers. 
SPECULATIVE NATURALISM, THE HUMANITIES AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES  
To evaluate speculative naturalism on the basis of its superior contributions to science 
and mathematics alone would be to miss the full significance of speculative naturalism, 
however. As Broad noted, the goal of speculative philosophy is to take  into account the 
41 Brian D. Josephson, ‘Biological Observer-Participation and Wheeler’s “Law without Law”’, Integral 
Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality, ed. Plamen L. Simeonov, Leslie S. Smith and Andrée C. Ehresmann, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2013, pp.253-258. 
42 See the essays in Integral Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality. 
43 Gian-Carlo Rota, Indiscrete Thoughts, Boston: Birkhauser, 1996, p.93. 
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whole range of human experience—scientific, social, ethical, aesthetic, and religious 
and to develop a conception of reality that does justice to all of these. Speculative 
naturalism, in contrast to the naturalism of analytic philosophers, is not only an 
affirmation of the ambitions of philosophy in the grand manner against any tendency 
to dissolve philosophy into apologetics for mainstream science; it is an affirmation of 
the cognitive claims and significance of the humanities. The most illuminating way to 
comprehend what this means is to consider the work of a recent defender of the 
humanities, Mikhail Epstein.  
Epstein offers not only a defense and guidance for reviving the humanities, but 
more importantly, a crucial clarification of what the humanities are and what role they 
should play. Succinctly: 
The crucial distinction between the humanities and the sciences is that in the 
humanities the subject and the object of study coincide; in the humanities, 
humans are studied by humans and for humans. Therefore, to study the human 
being also means to create humanness itself; every act of the description of the 
human is, by the same token, an event of one’s self construction. In a wholly 
practical sense, the humanities create the human, as human beings are 
transformed by the study of literature, art, languages, history and philosophy: the 
humanities humanize.’44  
Humans create themselves by creating ‘new images, signs and concepts of 
themselves … humans do not so much discover something in the world of objects as 
build their very subjectivity by way of self-description and self-projection.’45 Alluding to 
the way metamathematics and the theory of computation founder on problems of self- 
reference, Epstein notes that ‘the natural sciences are most interested in what makes 
the humanities “less scientific”, their subject-object reversibility, for example, their 
semantic fuzziness, and even the metaphoric nature of their language. The natural 
sciences cannot strive for the pinnacle of self-organized and self-reflective knowledge 
without the humanities’ critical contribution.’46 It is by virtue of this critical 
contribution that the humanities are not merely a supplement to science, but must lead 
it. As Epstein noted, ‘the humanities used to determine, and give meaning to historic 
eras. The era of Enlightenment was inaugurated by philosophy and literature…, the 
era of Romanticism came into being thanks to the creative efforts of literary critics, 
linguists, poets and writers…. It has traditionally been the role of the humanities to lead 
humankind.’47  
44 Mikhail Epstein, The Transformative Humanities: A Manifesto, New York: Bloomsbury, 2012, p.7. 
45 Ibid.p.8. 
46 Ibid.p.8f. 
47 Ibid.p.12. 
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Why should this be so? Epstein points out that the natural sciences are concerned 
with nature, and the practical extension of science is technology through which we 
transform nature. The human sciences study society, and their practical extension is 
politics through which society is transformed. The humanities focus on culture, and the 
practical extension of this is the transformation of culture. It is through the 
transformation of culture that we create ourselves as human. However, the natural 
sciences and the capacity to transform nature and the human sciences and the political 
power bequeathed by the social sciences to transform society are each part of culture. 
The natural scientist and the social scientist are themselves formations and products of 
culture. The whole project of understanding nature in order to transform it was 
launched by Francis Bacon, and it was the philosopher William Whewell in the 
nineteenth century who coined the term ‘scientist’. The role of the scientist was created 
by the humanities. The study of nature and society by the natural and social sciences 
are not only projects to comprehend these to facilitate their transformation; they are 
part of a humanities inspired project to define and form our relationship to nature and 
society. It is through the humanities that the nature and goal of science is defined. On 
the basis of this conception of the humanities and its role, Epstein endorsed 
Whitehead’s proclamation that ‘the task of a University is the creation of the future, so 
far as rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation, can affect the issue.’48 
The problem we now face, as many philosophers have recognized, is that the main 
forms of natural science are committing to explaining away not only consciousness but 
also life as mere appearances. There is no place for human subjects able to create 
themselves, and no place for the humanities that assume there is. Implicitly, 
mainstream reductionist scientists are committed to reducing nature and people to 
predictable instruments, and they believe that they have been and will continue to be 
successful at this. The naturalism of analytic philosophers inspired by Quine provides 
strong support for such a view. Do we still need the humanities? Do we need to 
cultivate humanity and produce humans willing to take responsibility for creating the 
future? Could we not accept what has been bequeathed to us by the humanities from 
the past and allow only forms of science that treat nature and people as only of 
significance insofar as they can be transformed to serve the economy and the quest of 
companies and governments to maximize profitability and GNP to be funded? 
Subjectivities will still be formed by the mind control industries of advertising and 
public relations, supplemented by psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and 
criminologists dealing with intransigent cases. The market as a self-regulating 
mechanism being imposed throughout the world to define all human relationships 
48 Ibid. p.15, quoted from Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, New York: Free Press, 1938, p.233. 
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provides all the feedback needed to generate economic progress. Science integrated 
and identified with technological research no longer requires people inspired by the 
quest for truth, even the very limited notion of truth upheld by Quine. Science 
graduates can be controlled like all other employees by human resource managers 
trained to extract the maximum output of profitable products for minimal inputs. The 
contradiction between a form of science that makes the very existence of science and 
scientists unintelligible can be ignored because scientists can now be treated as 
instruments for producing profitable technology, not heroic figures striving for true 
understanding of nature. Essentially, this is the agenda of neoliberalism.  
Is this new form of science delivering? While there have been some technological 
advances, the picture of science that is emerging in institutions where scientists who 
have given up the quest for truth and replaced it with the quest for publications and 
research grants is a noise explosion. Bruce Charlton, a medical researcher, recently 
published a book Not Even Trying: The Corruption of Real Science, decrying the current state 
of scientific research. He compared it to a factory in Poland before the collapse of 
communism: ’The factory was producing vast quantities of defective drinking glasses 
which nobody wanted. Nobody wanted to even use them. So the glasses were simply piling-
up in gigantic stacks around the factory building – using-up resources, getting in 
everybody’s way, and taking-up all the useful space.’49 Charlton suggested that science 
now is so bad it would be better to pay researchers to do nothing than to continue with 
what they are doing. This is the natural sciences.  
The human sciences are worse because what is produced is positively destructive. 
This is clearly the case with mainstream economics which has flourished because it 
provides ideological support for the neoliberal agenda, despite work of philosophers of 
science exposing its superficial resemblance to physics being a sham based on a 
misunderstanding of the conditions for deploying its mathematical models.50 Exponents 
of complexity theory such as Brian Arthur and Paul Ormerod, who do understand the 
role mathematics can and should play in science, have shown that economic systems 
generally do not have a tendency to move to equilibrium but are characterized by 
’increasing returns’ and catastrophes, undermining the basis for claiming that markets 
are an efficient means of allocating resources. Unconstrained markets can be expected 
to concentrate wealth and thereby power in regions, countries, corporations and 
individuals until they cripple the economy and society. After the global financial crisis 
49 Bruce G. Charlton, Not Even Trying: The Corruption of Real Science, Buckingham: University of Buckingham 
Press, 2012, p.14. Evidence in support of this claim is provided by Philip Mirowski in Science-Mart: Privatising 
American Science, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
50 This was demonstrated by Philip Mirowski in More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as 
Nature’s Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1989 and a series of other books.  
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brought about by the policies promoted by these economists, providing empirical 
evidence verifying theoretical criticisms of neo-classical economics, neo-classical 
economists continued dominating government economic policies, despite alternatives 
offered by the theoretically more defensible tradition of institutionalist economics.51 It is 
clear that with success in the market displacing the quest for truth as the criteria for 
determining research,52 ideas that augment the power of the powerful dominate no 
matter what the consequences. As for psychology and sociology, the vast majority of 
what purports to be scientific research in these subjects now bears very little 
resemblance to science.  
It appears that this neoliberal agenda has locked humanity into a trajectory that is 
concentrating wealth and power in the hands of a new global ruling class based in 
corporations, undermining democracy and paralysing efforts to deal with a global 
ecological crisis.53 Unconstrained markets do not provide the feedback necessary to 
generate appropriate responses to ecological destruction, and often accelerates 
ecologically destructive economic activity. Freed from control of public institutions 
upholding notions of truth and justice and a public committed to the common good, 
the market is no more self-regulating in the twenty first century than it was in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marxists who believe that the collapse of 
global capitalism will automatically liberate humanity have learnt nothing from the 
outcome of the Great Depression or the collapse of the Soviet Union. The revival of 
the humanities will be required to save civilization, as has always been the case. 
 This leads to the crucial and central concern of speculative naturalism running 
from Schelling to present day speculative naturalists: if the cognitive claims of the 
humanities are accepted, nature must be conceived in such a way that humans as 
aware, conscious, creative social subjects can have evolved within it. Reductionist 
science and the reductionist forms of explanation it has privileged must be wrong and 
should be replaced. Nature itself must be seen as creative, generative of emergent levels 
51 See Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Amongst Us: A Chilling Tale by John Quiggin, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010 and Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis go to Waste, London: Verso, 
2013. For an alternative set of policies based on the tradition of historical, institutionalist economics, see 
Erik S. Reiner ed., Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective, Cheltenham: 
Edgar Elgar, 2004. 
52 See Philip Mirowski, Science-Mart: Privatising American Science, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011 
for a description of how this has taken place. 
53 See Dmitry Orlov, The Five Stages of Collapse: Survivor’s Toolkit, Gabriola Island: New Society, 2013. The 
black humor with which this book is written should not blind readers to the profundity of Orlov’s 
observations. Much the same conclusions are reached in the anthology The Politics of Empire: Globalisation in 
Crisis edited by Alan Freeman and Boris Kagarlitsky, London: Pluto Press, 2004, published before the 
global financial crisis. 
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of organization not reducible to the conditions of their emergence. Ecology, which 
brings all this into focus, was and remains very much an anti-reductionist science 
engendered by, influenced by and reciprocally influencing the tradition of speculative 
naturalism.54 Recognizing that humans emerged from and are participants in 
ecosystems involves recognizing their potential for both creativity and destruction, and 
focuses attention on the conditions for the continued survival of humanity and 
civilization. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that speculative naturalists were among 
the early environmentalists and have been at the forefront of environmentalism up to 
the present, and at the forefront of efforts to address the global ecological crisis.  
SPECULATIVE NATURALISM AND THE CREATION OF THE FUTURE 
The development of the natural sciences on more defensible foundations provided by 
speculative naturalism, making science consistent with the reality of humans and their 
potential for understanding and creativity, is not only in the service of the pursuit of 
truth, however. It should be seen at the same time as a development of the humanities, 
involving a transformation of culture which should then transform humanity’s relation 
to the rest of nature. In place of the dictum that a thing is right when it tends to 
increase the profitability of transnational corporations, and is wrong when it tends 
otherwise, speculative naturalism supports Aldo Leopold’s dictum that: ‘A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It 
is wrong when it tends otherwise.’55 If the practical outcome of the sciences is 
technology, this science will lead to a different way of understanding technology, seeing 
it not as subduing nature to make it into a totally predictable instrument of the human 
will, but as augmenting the conditions for the flourishing of ecosystems, including the 
global ecosystem, of which humanity is a part. 
The alliance of post-reductionist science and the humanities effected through 
speculative naturalism has equally profound implications for the human sciences. The 
humanities preceded the development of the human sciences, which were often 
developed to oppose the humanities. This was followed by a counter-reaction to 
develop forms of human science supporting the humanities. This dialectic clarifies what 
is at stake, the significance of the broader opposition between science and the 
humanities and of the speculative naturalist quest to overcome this opposition. The 
humanities were developed in Renaissance Italy at a time when the liberty of its 
republics was under threat as a revival of the kind of education deemed necessary by 
54 See Robert E. Ulanowicz, Ecology: The Ascendent Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 
esp. p.6 and A Third Window, West Conshocken, Templeton Foundation Press, 2006, esp. chap.6. 
55 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac And Sketches Here and There, London: Oxford University Press, 1949, 
p.224f. 
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Cicero, under the influence of the Greek idea of paideia, to produce citizens able to 
govern themselves and defend the liberty of the republic. The rise of the mechanistic 
world-view was part of the counter-renaissance, a movement of thought in France and 
Britain opposed to republicanism and its ideas of liberty as self-governance.56 As a 
major figure in this counter-renaissance, Hobbes sought to characterize humans in a 
way that would render the civic humanist notion of liberty unintelligible, in reaction to 
which Giambattista Vico defended a new science upholding the humanities. This 
defense was continued by Johann Herder, the first person to develop the concept of 
culture in its modern sense. While Renaissance economics had focused on the 
conditions for fostering the development of people and their arts,57 Adam Smith’s 
economics influenced by Hobbes, Locke and Newton fostered possessive individualism 
while the historical school, influenced by Herder, kept alive the Renaissance tradition. 
What is at issue in the opposition between mainstream human sciences and the 
humanities and humanistic human sciences is whether people are to be studied in order 
to justify their subordination and to work out how to control them, or whether they are 
to be studied to reveal the conditions for the full development of their highest potential 
for liberty to govern themselves and to inspire them to strive for this liberty. This 
opposition runs through all the human sciences: economics (where classical and neo-
classical economics continue the tradition deriving from Hobbes, Locke and Smith, 
while institutionalist economics has its roots in the historical school), psychology, 
sociology and geography, and it runs through the opposition between orthodox 
Marxism (the form of Marxism that led Marx to write that if there is one thing that he 
knew, it was that he was not a Marxist) and humanist Marxism. In the opposition 
between these, the anti-humanists have always promoted themselves as ‘scientific’, 
attacking, undermining and debunking the ‘comforting illusions’ of the humanists.  
Speculative naturalism and the developments in science that it has inspired changes 
all this. It is the humanistic human sciences and humanistic psychology, along with the 
humanities generally, that through the influence of speculative naturalists are now 
finding support in the sciences. At the same time, however, speculative naturalism 
requires a radical rethinking of these humanistic approaches, since they now need to 
uphold this humanism while simultaneously seeing humans as part of and as 
participating within nature. Institutionalist economics is now provided with support, 
but there is also an expectation that this be developed as institutionalist ecological 
economics.58 Humanistic approaches in politics, sociology and geography, usually 
56 This has been shown in a number of the works of Quentin Skinner. 
57 See Erik S. Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich … And Why Poor Countries Stay Poor, New York: Carrol & 
Graf, 2007, chap. 2. 
58 As exemplified by Arild Vatn, Institutions and the Environment, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005. 
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associated with hermeneutics, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and humanistic 
Marxism also find support in such science, but there is also an expectation that these be 
developed as part of human ecology with human semiosis associated with culture 
understood as contributing to the semiosphere of the global ecosystem.59 And in all 
cases, there is an expectation that these disciplines conceive what they are studying as 
historical and evolving. 
If, as Epstein argued, the practical extension of the social sciences is the 
transformation of society through politics, then the goal of such transformation, the 
way that such transformation is conceived and how it is implemented by speculative 
naturalists will be fundamentally different than that of mainstream ‘scientific’ social 
science. Transformation will not involve controlling people so that they function as 
instruments of those with power, but inspiring people to create the natural and social 
forms, the built-up environments and institutions, that will augment their humanity 
and their capacity to augment the natural and social conditions for life and humanity. 
It will be a politics of ‘eco-poiesis’.60 Creating humans, this will involve developing and 
living out narratives, but not monologic narratives. It will involve the development of 
dialogic or polyphonic narratives that allow for diverse voices of participants to 
question and participate in revising and reformulating the stories they are living out, 
with stories themselves understood as components of the global semiosphere. They will 
be made responsible for their culture and its reformulation, a reformulation in which 
speculative naturalism will create new subjectivities, subjectivities committed to 
addressing and overcoming the threats civilization and humanity now face from 
ecological destruction. These are the subjectivities that will create a new era, the era 
the Chinese environmentalists have called for and dubbed ‘ecological civilization’. 
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59 On the semiosphere, see Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, trans. Barbara J. Haveland, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, chap.5. See also Arran Gare, ‘Philosophical Anthropology, 
Ethics and Political Philosophy in an Age of Impending Catastrophe’, Cosmos & History, Vol. 5(2), 2009: 
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Process Studies, 39(1), 2010: 5-38. 
                                                          
